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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
 
PORTER, Circuit Judge. 
Weih Chang appeals the District Court’s orders 
dismissing his complaint under the False Claims Act (“FCA”) 
and its Delaware counterpart. He argues that the District 
Court was obliged under those statutes to hold an in-person 
hearing before dismissing his claims. We disagree, so we will 
affirm. 
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I 
 
A 
 
The FCA prohibits the submission of false claims for 
payment to the United States. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1); 
United States ex rel. Petratos v. Genentech Inc., 855 F.3d 
481, 486 (3d Cir. 2017). To incentivize its own enforcement, 
the FCA allows private individuals to sue for alleged 
violations—called qui tam suits—and offers them a 
percentage of an eventual recovery. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d). 
 
In a typical qui tam action, a private party (called a 
“relator”) sues a defendant on behalf of the government for 
alleged FCA violations. The United States then has 60 days 
(plus any granted extensions) to review the claim and decide 
whether it will “elect to intervene and proceed with the 
action.” § 3730(b)(2). If the government intervenes, the 
relator has the right to continue as a party, but the government 
assumes the “primary responsibility for prosecuting the 
action.” § 3730(c)(1). If the government chooses not to 
intervene, the relator may still “conduct the action.” 
§ 3730(c)(3).  
 
Yet even under the latter scenario, the government 
may still “dismiss the action notwithstanding the objections 
of the person initiating the action if the person has been 
notified by the Government of the filing of the motion and the 
court has provided the person with an opportunity for a 
hearing on the motion.” § 3730(c)(2)(A).  
 
B 
 
Chang filed a qui tam action against the Children’s 
Advocacy Center of Delaware, asserting claims on behalf of 
the United States and the State of Delaware under the FCA 
and the Delaware False Claims Act (“DFCA”).1 In short, 
Chang alleged that the Center had applied for and received 
                                              
1 The FCA and the DFCA are materially identical for 
the purposes of this opinion. Compare 31 U.S.C. 
§ 3730(c)(2)(A), with Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 1204(b). 
4 
 
funding from the state and federal governments by 
misrepresenting certain material information. Both 
governments declined to intervene as plaintiffs, so Chang 
filed an amended complaint and the Center answered.  
 
Nearly three years after Chang had filed his original 
complaint, the United States and Delaware each moved to 
dismiss the case. The governments asserted that they had 
investigated Chang’s allegations and discovered them to be 
“factually incorrect and legally insufficient.” App. 114. 
Chang filed a consolidated opposition to the motions, 
contending that the Court should await summary judgment 
rather than dismiss the case, but did not request oral argument 
or a hearing.  
 
The District Court granted the governments’ motions 
without conducting an in-person hearing or issuing a 
supporting opinion. Chang timely appealed. 
 
II 
 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1331 and 1367, and 31 U.S.C. § 3732. We have appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the District 
Court’s grant of the governments’ motions to dismiss de 
novo. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 206 (3d 
Cir. 2005). 
 
III 
 
The issue presented is whether the District Court erred 
by granting the governments’ motions to dismiss Chang’s qui 
tam action without first conducting an in-person hearing. Put 
another way, since Chang never requested a hearing, does the 
FCA guarantee an automatic in-person hearing to relators 
before their cases may be dismissed? Chang says that it does. 
We disagree. 
 
The parties presented this appeal as an opportunity for 
us to take a side in a putative circuit split. On one hand, the 
Ninth Circuit says that courts have approval authority over 
the government’s decision to dismiss a qui tam suit. See 
United States ex rel. Sequoia Orange Co. v. Baird-Neece 
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Packing Corp., 151 F.3d 1139, 1145–46 (9th Cir. 1998). This 
test requires the government to show (1) “a valid government 
purpose” and (2) “a rational relation between dismissal and 
accomplishment of the purpose.” Id. at 1145. If the 
government meets these prongs, “the burden switches to the 
relator to demonstrate that dismissal is fraudulent, arbitrary 
and capricious, or illegal.” Id. The Tenth Circuit has also 
adopted this standard. See United States ex rel. Ridenour v. 
Kaiser-Hill Co., LLC, 397 F.3d 925, 934–35 (10th Cir. 2005). 
 
The D.C. Circuit, by contrast, has held that the United 
States has “an unfettered right” to dismiss a qui tam case. See 
Swift v. United States, 318 F.3d 250, 252–53 (D.C. Cir. 
2003); Hoyte v. Am. Nat’l Red Cross, 518 F.3d 61, 65 (D.C. 
Cir. 2008). The Executive, says that court, has “absolute 
discretion” under the Take Care Clause of the Constitution on 
“whether to bring an action on behalf of the United States,” 
and the FCA nowhere purports to take that discretion away. 
Swift, 318 F.3d at 252–53 (citing Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 
821, 830 (1985)). 
 
We need not take a side in this circuit split because 
Chang fails even the more restrictive standard. 
 
The government has an interest in minimizing 
unnecessary or burdensome litigation costs. See Sequoia, 151 
F.3d at 1146 (“[T]he government can legitimately consider 
the burden imposed on the taxpayers by its litigation[;] … 
even if the relators were to litigate the FCA claims, the 
government would continue to incur enormous internal staff 
costs.”); Swift, 318 F.3d at 254 (“[T]he government’s goal of 
minimizing its expenses is … a legitimate objective, and 
dismissal of the suit furthered that objective.”). The United 
States and Delaware both cited this goal in their motions to 
dismiss. And dismissing a case is, of course, the easiest way 
to achieve that objective.  
 
Once the governments moved to dismiss, the burden 
then shifted to Chang “to demonstrate that dismissal is 
fraudulent, arbitrary and capricious, or illegal.” Sequoia, 151 
F.3d at 1145. He failed to do so, but says that this is beside 
the point because the FCA guarantees him an automatic in-
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person hearing at which he should have been allowed to 
introduce evidence to satisfy his burden. 
 
The plain language of both the FCA and the DFCA 
provides relators an “opportunity for a hearing” when the 
government moves to dismiss. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A); 
Del. Code tit. 6, § 1204. Chang would have us hold that the 
District Court erred by not sua sponte scheduling and 
conducting an in-person hearing, even though Chang never 
requested one. An “opportunity for a hearing,” however, 
requires that relators avail themselves of the “opportunity.” 
Indeed, most courts that have considered this language have 
held that an in-person hearing is unnecessary unless the 
relator expressly requests a hearing or makes a colorable 
threshold showing of arbitrary government action. See, e.g., 
Sequoia Orange, 151 F.3d at 1145 (“A hearing is appropriate 
‘if the relator presents a colorable claim that the settlement or 
dismissal is unreasonable in light of existing evidence, that 
the Government has not fully investigated the allegations, or 
that the Government’s decision was based on arbitrary or 
improper considerations.’” (quoting S. Judiciary Comm., 
False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, S. Rep. No. 99-345, 
at 26 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5291)); 
cf. Swift, 318 F.3d at 251 (noting that the district court held a 
hearing when the relator “opposed dismissal and requested a 
hearing”).2 We find these decisions persuasive.3 We thus hold 
                                              
2 See also, e.g., United States ex rel. Mateski v. 
Mateski, 634 F. App’x 192, 194 (9th Cir. 2015) (“The district 
court did not err in denying Mateski a hearing in this case 
because Mateski is only entitled to a hearing if he presents a 
colorable claim[.]”); Martin v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 
No. CV 118-009, 2019 WL 166554, at *3 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 10, 
2019) (“[T]he Court finds that it is unnecessary to hold a 
hearing in this case before granting the Government’s motion 
to dismiss.”); United States v. Acad. Mortg. Corp., No. 16-
CV-02120-EMC, 2018 WL 1947760, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 
25, 2018) (“The relator is not entitled to an evidentiary 
hearing as a matter of right.”). 
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3 We note that some courts hold that a “hearing” in this 
context includes written submissions. See, e.g., United States 
ex rel. Sibley v. Delta Reg’l Med. Ctr., No. 
417CV000053GHDRP, 2019 WL 1305069, at *10 (N.D. 
Miss. Mar. 21, 2019) (“Sibley also contends that she is 
entitled to an evidentiary hearing as a matter of right. Not so. 
Again, Sibley cites no statutory basis for that request. As 
numerous courts have held, the hearing requirement is 
satisfied by allowing the relator an opportunity to submit a 
response to the motion.” (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted)); United States ex rel. May v. City of 
Dallas, No. 3:13-CV-4194-N-BN, 2014 WL 5454819, at *4 
(N.D. Tex. Oct. 27, 2014) (“Under 31 U.S.C. § 
3730(c)(2)(A), a relator is entitled to ‘an opportunity for a 
hearing on the motion [to dismiss].’ As the undersigned noted 
in affording Relator an opportunity to respond to the motion 
to dismiss, the hearing requirement is satisfied by allowing 
the relator an opportunity to submit a response to the 
motion[.]” (citations omitted)). This approach is analogous to 
our decision that the phrase “civil, criminal, or administrative 
hearing” in a similar FCA provision encompasses any 
“allegations and information disclosed in connection with 
civil, criminal, or administrative litigation.” United States ex 
rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v. Prudential 
Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 1149, 1156 (3d Cir. 1991). We take no 
position on whether this is the correct interpretation of 
“hearing” in this context.  
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that the dismissal provisions in the FCA and DFCA do not 
guarantee an automatic in-person hearing in every instance.4 
 
Chang never requested a hearing. Nor did his 
opposition demonstrate that the governments’ motions were 
arbitrary or capricious. So the District Court did not err in 
granting the governments’ motions to dismiss his qui tam 
action without holding an in-person hearing. We will affirm 
the orders of the District Court. 
                                              
4 The need for a request to trigger a hearing is 
supported by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
“opportunity for a public hearing” in similar administrative 
contexts. See, e.g., Costle v. Pac. Legal Found., 445 U.S. 198, 
202, 214 (1980) (holding that the EPA reasonably construed 
the language “opportunity for a public hearing” as not 
requiring a public hearing where none was requested); Nat’l 
Indep. Coal Operators’ Ass’n v. Kleppe, 423 U.S. 388, 398 
(1976) (“[The statute] provides the mine operators with no 
more than ‘an opportunity’ for a hearing. The word 
‘opportunity’ would be meaningless if the statute 
contemplated formal adjudicated findings whether or not a 
requested evidentiary hearing is held. … [T]he language of 
the statute … requires the Secretary to make formal findings 
of fact … only when the mine operator requests a hearing. 
The requirement for a formal hearing … is keyed to a request, 
and the requirement for formal findings is keyed to the same 
request.”). 
